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GORDON H MCCORMICK & FRANK GIORDANO
ABSTRACT Nascent insurgencies often face an opening mobilisation dilemma
that can cripple their ability to grow into a mature threat to the state. The
source of this dilemma lies in the fact that the great majority of people who are
prepared to support an insurgency in principle are only willing to do so
conditionally, depending not only on the costs and beneﬁts of their alternatives
but the probabilities they assign to each side’s success. At the outset of such
conﬂicts, when the emerging group is very small, the probability that the
insurgency will be successful is low and the probability that it will fail is high.
The expected costs of participation are correspondingly high, and the expected
beneﬁts of supporting the opposition are low. Why would anyone join such an
undertaking? We examine how armed opposition groups resolve this dilemma
through the use of symbolic violence and the manipulation of violent images. If
successful, they transform their generated images into facts to achieve a self-
sustaining mobilisation programme.
It may be that the race is not always to the swift, nor
the battle to the strong—but that is the way to bet. (Damon Runyon)
Insurgent organisations typically form around a core group of activists. Such
groups think big, but begin small. They must eventually grow to win. The
state, for its part, need only keep an emerging insurgency from growing to
defeat it. Viewed from this perspective, the struggle between an insurgency
and an incumbent regime can be thought of as a mobilisation contest with
three possible outcomes. First, if the insurgency is able to maintain a positive
rate of growth, over time it will eventually reach the point where it can either
defeat or displace its opponent. Second, if its net rate of growth after attrition
stabilises short of what is needed to win, but is still suﬃcient to allow it to
stay in the game, the conﬂict can continue indeﬁnitely. This will not change
until the underlying parameters of the struggle change in a way that gives one
side or the other a game-winning advantage, or changing political
circumstances permit the players to achieve a negotiated ending. Finally, if
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the original charter group is unable to grow much beyond the size of its
opening membership, it will not pose a signiﬁcant political challenge. It may
continue to be a political irritant, until defeated, without ever becoming big
enough to pose a threat. When it comes to waging an internal war, as the
saying goes, size matters.
While an insurgency must grow to win, the challenge it faces in carrying
out a winning mobilisation programme varies widely over the course of the
conﬂict. As an empirical rule, mobilisation is generally quite diﬃcult during
the early stages of the struggle, when the insurgency is small. It becomes
much easier during the ﬁnal period of the conﬂict when the correlation of
forces between the two sides has been reversed, the insurgent group has seized
the psychological initiative, and the state is approaching its breakpoint. The
reason for this, which is easy to appreciate, is that most individuals who
participate in such conﬂicts, on both sides, do so conditionally; they are
rarely prepared to do so unconditionally. There will always be a small
number of individuals who are willing to support their side under any
circumstances. The great majority—though they may have a distinct
preference for one side or the other—hedge their bets and are prepared in
principle to support either player, as necessary, depending on each side’s
relative prospects.
The underlying source of this dynamic is the fact that most people do not
simply choose between one side or the other based on the beneﬁts and costs
they assign to their alternatives. They also do so in relation to the probability
they assign to actually receiving the beneﬁts and incurring the costs
associated with these alternatives should they choose one course of action
over another. This assessment, in turn, is strongly inﬂuenced by their beliefs
about the relative strength of each side and the anticipated course and
outcome of the conﬂict. By inﬂuencing popular expectations, and through
this, the expected value of supporting one player against the other popular
beliefs about the shifting balance of power has a signiﬁcant and highly
variable inﬂuence over the context in which both sides approach mobilisation.
All things being equal, an image of relative strength makes the strong side
relatively more attractive. Its mobilisation challenge, in this case, is smaller
than it would be if it were ‘weak’. Similarly, an image of relative weakness
makes the weak side less attractive. Its mobilisation challenge, in this case, is
greater than it would be if it were ‘strong’.
The fact that the great majority of individuals who might be willing to
support the opposition are prepared to do so only conditionally, based on
their beliefs about the relative strength of the opposition, can pose a
potentially crippling paradox for an incipient insurgency. If a budding
opposition group is going to get to the point where it can pose a credible
threat to the state and eventually go on to win, it must be able to mobilise
signiﬁcant popular support. Its ability to solicit such support is inﬂuenced by
perceptions of its relative strength and the credibility people assign to its
threats and promises. This, in turn, depends signiﬁcantly on the size of its
following. Herein lays the dilemma. A group’s ability to mobilise support in
most environments is strongly inﬂuenced by its strength, but being strong




























assumes that it has already mobilised a signiﬁcant base of support. Why
would anyone join such an undertaking in the ﬁrst place when the group is
weak, so weak in fact that the likelihood of an early and violent loss is all but
guaranteed? If no one is willing to join in the beginning, how do insurgencies
ever win in the end?
The short answer to this last question, of course, is that most do not. The
great majority of armed opposition groups die young, without ever resolving
the paradox of how to transform their opening position of weakness into a
winning position of strength. The purpose of this article is to examine how
insurgents overcome this paradox through the use of symbolic violence. If the
preferences and expectations of its target population inﬂuence the growth of
an insurgency, what role does violence play in shaping popular attitudes?
What inﬂuence can this be expected to have on an opposition group’s ability
to mobilise support?What inﬂuence will this have on the counter-mobilisation
eﬀorts of the state? What factors inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of a mobilisation
campaign that is based, in part, on the targeted use of terrorism and other
forms of symbolic violence? What considerations inﬂuence an insurgency’s
targeting strategy and selection of targets? Are these factors constant, or can
they be expected to change during the course of the struggle? Our discussion
oﬀers a way of evaluating these and related questions of interest.
The paradox of armed mobilisation
To evaluate this issue we must turn brieﬂy to the fundamental question of
why individuals choose to support (or not support) opposition organisations.
We assume in our discussion that people are rational in the simple sense that,
given a list of alternatives, they will select the course of action they believe
will oﬀer them the highest expected return. If the expected beneﬁts of joining
or otherwise supporting the opposition seem to outweigh the expected costs,
and the payoﬀ is higher than the net return of other alternatives, individuals
will sign on. If the expected costs of joining outweigh the expected beneﬁts, or
another alternative appears to be more attractive, they will look for ways to
avoid co-operating. Should any of this change, people can be expected to
change their course of action, in turn. They will act and react in ways that
seem to oﬀer them the best possible return.
None of this implies that the choices people make are not ‘embedded in
emotions, sentiments, social norms, conventions, or habits’. Nor does it
imply that a person’s ability to calculate the costs and beneﬁts of his/her
alternatives, or even identify what his options are, is not often ‘based on
faulty information, distorted perceptions, and erroneous arithmetic.’1 In
every case (and in every way) the choices people make are subjective, based
on a highly personalised (and variable) utility function, socially conditioned
values, imperfect information, and a sometimes surprising inability to sort
through and evaluate the information they have available to them at the time.
The assumption of human rationality comes in ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants.
In the ﬁrst instance people are assumed to act with an ordered and stable set





























Accordingly, they are always assumed to be able to make accurate forecasts
and optimal decisions. In the second case, which is the sense that we use it
here, individuals are simply assumed to act in their self-interest according to
their beliefs about the world, which are often at odds with reality. Their
choices, in this case, are often sub-optimal, even if they appear to be the best
course of action at the time.
Decisions of this type, though often imperfect, are still forward looking
and consequential. The choices people make in such cases are based on their
beliefs about the immediate and future consequences of current actions.
Those operating with a high time discount will be concerned more with the
immediate eﬀects of today’s decisions. Those with a low time discount will
place a greater weight on the future, focusing on the expected consequences
of current choices down the road. In both instances, however, the decision to
support (and not support) an opposition group, depends on the answers to
four sets of questions. What alternatives are available? What are the expected
eﬀects of these alternatives? What value is placed on these expected
alternatives? What decision rule should be applied to select the ‘best’ course
of action given the alternatives and their consequences?2 People’s ability to
answer these questions may be limited by time, information, pre-existing
biases, and other factors that will interfere with their ability to make an
optimal choice. But, they will do the best they can, given the constraints they
face, to select the course of action with the highest return.
In considering how such choices are actually made it is important that we
distinguish between an individual’s pure and eﬀective preferences. People can
be said to act on pure preferences if their decisions are based only on their
preferred outcomes, without regard to the probability that these outcomes
will occur. They can be said to act on their eﬀective preferences, by contrast,
if their decisions are based on the expected utility of their alternatives,
regardless of what their strict preferences might otherwise dictate. The net
payoﬀs associated with the possible outcomes of these alternatives, in such
cases, must be weighted by the probability that they will actually be realised.
This requires not only evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of one’s choices given
an outcome, but assessing the probabilities of these alternative outcomes
given one’s choice. This is a simple matter if the choice one makes
will determine the event. It is a diﬀerent problem altogether when an
individual must make a decision which will have little or no inﬂuence over
what actually occurs. What one chooses to do, in this case, will not inﬂuence
the outcome, but the anticipated outcome will certainly inﬂuence what one
chooses to do.
The distinction between the two perspectives is important in situations in
which the payoﬀ depends not only on what occurs but on the nature of one’s
choice. This is one obvious diﬀerence between casting a ballot in the privacy
of the voting booth and supporting (or refusing to support) an armed
opposition group. The decision, in the ﬁrst case, is a closed choice. The payoﬀ
one receives may depend on who is elected, but it does not depend on the
candidate one chooses to vote for. This is not generally the case in an internal
war. The decision to take sides (or not) in an insurgency is generally an open




























choice. This is certainly true in the eyes of the recipient, who will have a fairly
good idea of whom s/he can count on for support. It will often be known (or
at least suspected) by the other side as well, to the degree that it has been able
to identify its opponent’s base of popular support, or that support for its own
eﬀorts was solicited and refused. The net payoﬀ people can be expected to
receive, in such cases, is not only tied to the outcome of the ﬁght, but to
which side they chose to back along the way. There will typically be a
premium for having backed the winner and a penalty for those who have
backed the loser.3
Popular expectations concerning which side is likely to win, in this respect,
will have a key inﬂuence over each side’s level of popular support.
Expectations, in turn, are shaped by the size of the opposition, which is
used as a means of measuring its future prospects given the historical power
of the state. At its inception and during the initial phase of the struggle, for
example, the insurgents are operating from a position of distinct
disadvantage. Their prospects for victory at this time are objectively quite
poor and the expected net returns to membership are correspondingly low.
Should this balance of advantage begin to change, the expected beneﬁts of
joining will improve. Other things being equal, the insurgency’s level of
support, in this case, will increase (and that of the incumbent will decrease).
More people can be expected to coalesce around the underground as the
balance of advantage (and the likelihood of success) continues to shift against
the state. As the regime disintegrates, the opposition will be swept into power
on a wave of popular support. Where few people were willing to join in the
beginning, many will do so in the end. Most ‘revolutionaries’ arrive at the
revolution late.4
For most individuals the decision to support one side or the other in an
internal war is not only inﬂuenced by one’s preferences, it is also inﬂuenced
by the behaviour (or perceived behaviour) of other agents. These considera-
tions can reinforce one another, which will be the case when one’s preferred
outcome corresponds to the choices and corresponding actions of others, or
they can oﬀset one another, which is the case when what one prefers to see
happen is diﬀerent from what other people are doing. Deciding whether or
not to support the opposition in the ﬁrst case is easy. If one has a net
preference for the insurgents and everyone else appears to be rallying to their
side, the rational activist will support them in turn. Similarly, if one prefers
the state and the opposition seems to be having diﬃculty mobilising support,
the rational loyalist will continue to rally around the ﬂag. It is when these two
considerations oﬀset one another that we will often see people make choices
that are at odds with their preferences. This is true when one prefers the
insurgents but does not support them because they are losing. It is also the
case where one prefers the status quo but supports the opposition because it
seems destined to win.
This dynamic is one example of a broad class of strategic problems in
which an individual’s best course of action depends as much on the choices
made by others as on the choices s/he makes for him or herself. Such





























is impossible to assign objective probabilities to diﬀerent outcomes to which
the subjective estimates of the participants will converge.5 The payoﬀ
associated with any particular choice in these cases continues to depend on
the outcome of the game. The game’s outcome, however, depends on what
others decide to do. One’s payoﬀ, in this case, is tied to the behaviour of
other participants. The actions taken by other agents help deﬁne one’s own
decision environment, just as one’s own actions help deﬁne the decision
environment of others. The interdependent nature of such decisions means
that, while an individual’s best choice still depends on the expected costs and
beneﬁts of the alternatives, the probabilities that s/he assigns to these
alternatives depend on his/her assumptions about how others will respond to
the same set of choices.
This is precisely the situation that confronts individuals considering
whether or not they should join or otherwise support an armed resistance
group. For most people the right choice will depend on the context of the
struggle. Who is in charge? Is the opposition winning or losing? Are these
trends likely to continue or change over time? The answers to these questions
will depend, to a signiﬁcant degree, on the relative strength of the insurgency.
As noted above, if the insurgency is large and appears to be gaining the upper
hand, getting on board may seem to be a smart option. If it is small and
appears to be unable to gain any political traction, joining will be much less
attractive. The problem in this case, of course, is that it takes people to
attract people. While an individual’s willingness to support the resistance will
depend on its relative size and future prospects, its size and associated
prospects will depend on the number of individuals who have already decided
to join. How many people are willing to support the opposition, in other
words, will depend to a signiﬁcant degree on how many people (appear to)
have already signed on.
The relationship between group strength, group prospects and an
individual’s readiness to join leads to a central paradox of collective action.
Support for the opposition, under these circumstances, will increase in direct
response to an increase in popular expectations of its success. Its prospects
for success, however, will increase in relation to its base of popular support.
While this can work to a group’s advantage once they are up and running, it
leads to the question of how such groups ever get started in the ﬁrst place.
Even if some percentage of the target population ﬁnds it advantageous to
throw their support behind a group that is likely to succeed, there is little to
gain for most people in supporting a cause that is likely to fail, and should it
do so, fail violently. At the beginning of the game, the probability of failure is
very high. Why, then, would anyone wish to join such an enterprise in the
ﬁrst place? If no one is willing to be ﬁrst, no one can be second, in which case
the group will never be able to grow beyond its opening, hard-core
membership. Insurgencies face a dilemma: until they are able to establish an
eﬀective base of support they cannot go on to win, but until they convince
people that they are winning, it is very hard to mobilise a winning base of
support.




























A simple model of conditional mobilisation
This mobilisation relationship can be modelled as a classic example of
conditional response.6 It has been studied generally by Schelling, and more
speciﬁcally, with regard to the problem of collective action, by Granovetter,
Kuran, and Marwell and Oliver, among others.7 The mobilisable population,
as we have suggested elsewhere, can be divided into three groups: core
supporters of the state, core supporters of the insurgency, and a large middle
group of individuals who are prepared to support one side or the other
depending on the circumstances of the struggle.8 Each side’s ‘hard-core’ base
of support is recruitable by that side alone. For the sake of simplicity, we will
also assume that each side’s core supporters oﬀer their allegiance
unconditionally. That is to say, their choice is deﬁned ideologically and is
not tied to the behaviour of other members of the population or other criteria
that bear on each side’s performance and prospects; by contrast, the majority
of the population can be recruited by either side. While most people are likely
to have an opening preference for one side or the other, which side they
support will depend on the expected costs and beneﬁts of their alternatives.
This will be conditioned by their assumptions of others’ behaviour.
The decision on the part of most members of the population to either join
the opposition or join the state, in this respect, depends on two sets of
considerations. The ﬁrst is the relative costs and beneﬁts they assign to
supporting the two sides, given their preferences. Second is the probability
they assign to each side’s chances of success. In its simplest form, then, this
decision is based on the following assessments, where the insurgency¼ r and
the incumbent¼ s:
We assume that individuals can choose to either support the insurgency,
support the incumbent, or support neither side.9 Those who side with the
opposition receive a net present beneﬁt of br – cr. The insurgency goes on to
win with probability pr and its supporters receive the downstream beneﬁt brr.
It also loses with probability ps¼ 17pr and its supporters incur the future
cost crs. Thus, the expected value of supporting the opposition is given by the
expression
EVðrÞ ¼ br  cr þ prðbrrÞ  psðcrsÞ; where crs  0:00
Similarly, those who choose to support the state receive an immediate net
return of bs – cs. The incumbent wins the ﬁght with probability ps¼ 1 – pr and
they receive the downstream beneﬁt bss. The state loses with probability pr
br, present beneﬁts of joining r bs, present beneﬁts of joining s
cr, present costs of joining r cs, present costs of joining s
brr beneﬁts of joining r if r wins bss, beneﬁts of joining s if s wins
crs, costs of joining r if s wins csr, costs of joining s if r wins





























and its supporters incur the cost csr. Thus the expected value of supporting
the state is
EVðsÞ ¼ bs  cs þ psðbssÞ  prðcsrÞ; where csr  0
Considering these simple alternatives, the rational individual will decide to
support the insurgents (and, if necessary, abandon the incumbent) when
EVðRÞ > EVðSÞ
or, when
br  cr þ prðbrrÞ  psðcrsÞ > bs  cs þ psðbssÞ  prðcsrÞ:
The elements of this last expression are broken out and compared in Table 1.
As we can see, the likelihood that a person will agree to support the
insurgency will increase with an increase in the present net beneﬁts of joining,
an increase in the future beneﬁts of joining, and a decrease in the future costs
of joining. Or, of particular importance for our discussion here, the rise in
support will ﬂow directly from an increase in the probability that the
insurgents will prevail and the state will be defeated. The latter will not only
increase the expected beneﬁts of supporting the opposition should they win, it
will increase the expected beneﬁts and decrease the risks of supporting the
group over the course of the struggle.
The probability individuals assign to an opposition win, as we have said, is
a rough function of the perceived size (strength) of the rebellion in relation to
the strength of the state. Their willingness to join the rebellion is conditioned
accordingly. For any given set of preferences, then, our recruitable
population can be distributed according to the minimum number of people
that must already have chosen to join the rebels before each individual in the
population decides it is in their interest to participate. Every ‘conditional’
member of society, in this sense, has a response number.10 These response
numbers can be aggregated in a bar chart that illustrates the responsiveness
of the population as a function of group size. The vertical axis of the bar
chart, in this case, measures the total number of people who are willing to
support the insurgency, xw, in relation to the number of people who (are
believed to) have already joined, xp, for a given perceived size (strength) of
the state, y0.
11 If we idealise this relationship, we have a continuous function
TABLE 1. Comparing the expected value of supporting the insurgency and the incumbent
Insurgency Incumbent
Present net beneﬁt of joining br7 crþ bs7 csþ
Expected future beneﬁt of joining pr (brr)7 ps (bss)7
Expected future cost of joining ps (crs) pr (csr)




























xw¼ f(xp), for 0 xp 1 where f(xp) consists of that fraction of the
population that is prepared to join the insurgency based on their belief that
xp of the population has already done so. It is reasonable to assume that f(xp)
is a monotonic non-decreasing function of xp.
Our resulting cumulative function f(xp) will be represented by an S-shaped
curve, as shown in Figure 1. As we can see, there is a small subset of the
population P, represented by kx*, which is prepared to join the opposition
regardless of group strength. This represents the insurgents’ core base of
support. It serves as the initial nucleus for the creation of a larger, follow-on
organisation. The incumbent, as we have said, enjoys a similar core base of
support represented by P7kx¼ ky*, where kx measures the limit of the
insurgent’s mobilisation potential. For everyone else (kx – kx*), the decision to
support the opposition will depend on their beliefs about the size of x. As we
can see in our example, the insurgent’s mobilisation curve starts out slowly
from xp¼ 0 to roughly xp¼ 0.1, where it begins to curve upward at an
increasing rate. As x appears to grow, the number of people who are willing
to support the opposition will begin to grow at an increasing rate. At roughly
xp¼ 0.45, the curve shows an inﬂection point. At this point it begins to bend
downward. The numbers of people who are willing to support the opposition
during this phase in the mobilisation process are still increasing as a function
of xp, but at a decreasing rate. At about xp¼ 0.9 the slope of the group’s
mobilisation curve approaches zero. At this point the number of people
willing to join the opposition equals kx or P7ky* and the group has reached
its zenith.
The changing slope of the group’s reaction curve reﬂects the changing
conditionality of recruitment over the course of the mobilisation process. A
group’s mobilisation curve, in this respect, represents the responsiveness of
potential supporters. The responsiveness of the group’s potential base of





























support can be measured at any point by the diﬀerence between the number
of people who are willing to join the group and the number that must appear
to have joined to maintain that same level of membership. All things being
equal, the less sensitive people are to the size and prospects of the opposition,
the more rapidly mobilisation will proceed. What is of particular importance,
however, is whether or not this measure is greater or less than 1. Where the
degree of conditionality is greater than 1, any perceived increase in group size
will result in a greater than equal increase in the number of people who are
willing to support the group in turn. By contrast, in cases where the
conditionality of recruitment is less than 1, a perceived increase in the size of
the group will result in a less than equal increase in potential members.
To explore the signiﬁcance of this measure we can turn to Figure 2. At
those points along the group’s reaction curve f(xp)¼ xw, we can see that the
mobilisation process is in equilibrium: the number of people who are willing
to support the insurgency at these points is equal to the perceived strength of
the insurgency deﬁned by xp. In our example there are three such equilibria,
which correspond to the points at which f(xp) intersects the reference line
xw¼ xp. If we pause to consider the mobilisation dynamics that underlie each
of these equilibria we can see that the growth problem an opposition group
faces along its mobilisation path is quite diﬀerent. During the later period of
the mobilisation process, between xc and x2, the group’s reaction curve is
upwardly unstable. Any increase in xp will generate a self-reinforcing increase
in xw. Beyond xc, in other words, the group’s ability to expand its base of
support will be self-sustaining. The opposite is true, as we can see, during the
initial period of the mobilisation process. The mobilisation eﬀort between x1
and xc is downwardly unstable. At any point along this portion of the curve
the group will tend to collapse back to x1. Where growth, in the end, is self-
generating, in the beginning it is unsustainable.
FIGURE 2. Stable and unstable equilibria.




























The character of a group’s mobilisation challenge, then, can be quite
diﬀerent, depending on the shape and position of its response curve. This is
illustrated in Figure 3, where we show three alternative response curves, each
of which represents a diﬀerent mobilisation environment. Curve A represents
an environment of high ‘revolutionary readiness’.12 A signiﬁcant percentage
of the population, in this case, is spring loaded to revolt. While people’s
willingness to declare themselves for the opposition still depends on the
behaviour of others, every point along the response curve is greater than 1.
Achieving a high steady state in this environment will not be diﬃcult. Any
initial eﬀort to jump start a rebellion will prove to be self-sustaining from its
inception to the point at which a stable equilibrium is approached at about
f(xp)¼ 0.7.13 This can be contrasted with the case represented by Curve C, in
which every point along the curve is less than 1. The group, in this instance,
faces a paradox over the entire course of its response curve. While a
signiﬁcant percentage of the population is prepared to support the opposition
in principle, its would-be supporters are waiting for others to make the ﬁrst
move. Because others view the problem in a similar manner, no ﬁrst move is
made and the group is never able to get oﬀ the ground. The state wins by
default.
The typical insurgent mobilisation environment is shown in Curve B,
which corresponds to the response curve shown in Figure 2.14 The dynamics
associated with this environment illustrate the mobilisation dilemma that
opposition groups face during the opening period of the struggle. If the
insurgents can manage to reach and surpass xc, they can be conﬁdent of
continuing to expand to x2. The group’s ability to expand to x2, in this case, is
aided by a bandwagon eﬀect that is achieved once it reaches a point of critical
mass. We refer to the threshold at xc as the insurrection point. The problem
the group faces is getting to this point in the ﬁrst place. While it is easy to see





























how mobilisation will reach x1 and take oﬀ between xc and x2, it is not
apparent how the group will be able to grow from x1 to xc. Regardless of how
many people the opposition will be able to attract short of its insurrection
point, it appears to be doomed to fall back to the stable equilibrium at x1.
This problem captures the central paradox of collective action. Even people
who might otherwise be sympathetic to the resistance will be reluctant to join
if a suﬃcient number of others have not already done so. In the absence of an
early willingness to join, this ‘suﬃcient’ number can never be generated and
the opposition is unlikely to ever become strong enough to pose a viable
threat.
To summarise, a population’s willingness to support an armed opposition
group is typically conditioned by the participation of others. Where this is the
case, insurgents face an opening mobilisation challenge that must be
overcome before they can pose a signiﬁcant threat to the standing
government. If a group is able to resolve this dilemma, it can grow to the
point where its subsequent ability to grow is self-reinforcing. This can
continue until the group reaches a high-level plateau at kx, which deﬁnes its
hypothetical limit. In our simple model the only subsets of the population
that will still be unwilling to play ball at this point are core supporters of the
old regime. If the opposition is still not strong enough to win, (ie if it is
unable to push the incumbent below its breakpoint) it will be in a position to
continue the game indeﬁnitely. It is likely to continue to pose a signiﬁcant
threat to the state until it is either pushed back below its point of critical mass
or it experiences a fundamental change in the parameters that underlie its
mobilisation function.
Violence and conditional mobilisation
The question, then, is how do insurgents overcome their opening paradox?
According to much of the literature on collective action, rebel groups attempt
to resolve this dilemma by oﬀering selective incentives (side payments) to
those they wish to recruit until the net payoﬀ of supporting the resistance is
greater than the net payoﬀs associated with their alternatives. Those who are
not wedded to the old regime, in this argument, are essentially bought oﬀ by
the insurgents with a package of (individual and individualised) incentives to
solicit their co-operation. While this explanation is an important one, it is
able to tell us only part of the story. This is particularly true at the beginning
of the game, where the same material weaknesses that limit a group’s ability
to mobilise (even sympathetic) supporters during the early phase of the
struggle also limit its ability to oﬀer meaningful side payments. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, an insurgent group’s ability to oﬀer eﬀective
incentives is itself conditioned by popular expectations that the opposition
will make good on its promises (and threats), in contrast to those made by the
other side. This, again, is limited by the opening weakness of the opposition,
which must demonstrate its credibility before it can make a credible case.
This brings us back to our original mobilisation dilemma, which remains
unresolved.




























To complete the picture of how insurgents are able to resolve this paradox
we must not only consider a group’s ability to inﬂuence the costs and beneﬁts
of participation (and non-participation), but the ways in which these costs
and beneﬁts are inﬂuenced by agent expectations. Popular expectations, as
we have said, are themselves conditioned by the expectations and subsequent
behavior of others. What this means as a practical matter is that getting
people on board will often require shaping (or reshaping) popular beliefs
about what other people are doing. What is important in this case is not what
is true, but what people believe to be true. Opposition groups, in this respect,
are in a position to manipulate popular beliefs about their size and future
prospects in an eﬀort to increase the expected beneﬁts of participation.
Should people come to believe that an ever larger percentage of the
population is losing conﬁdence in the incumbent and is shifting its support to
the opposition, an ever larger percentage will be willing to support them in
turn. This can result in a situation in which popular beliefs are eventually
self-conﬁrming.15 If the guerrilla organisation’s resulting growth in support is
great enough to exceed its point of critical mass, its mobilisation eﬀort will
experience a bandwagon eﬀect that can push it up to a new high-level,
sustainable equilibrium.
Insurgent groups attempt to overcome this opening mobilisation challenge
through the manipulation of violent images. Speciﬁcally, we can identify
three important eﬀects that symbolic violence can have on the mobilisation
process.
Agitation eﬀect
Violence, in this case, is used as an instrument of armed propaganda. The
objective is to advertise the existence of an emerging opposition, raise
popular consciousness and deﬁne the terms of the struggle. As Thomas
Thornton has suggested, incumbents typically enter an insurgency in a
natural state of political ‘inertia’, even in the absence of signiﬁcant popular
support. The insurgents, for their part, begin the game as outsiders, an alien
political force which ‘the organism of society will be predisposed to cast
out’.16 Before the opposition can even begin the process of building a base of
popular support it must ﬁrst be able to disrupt the system’s inertial
stability.17 ‘In order to do this, the insurgents must break the tie that binds
the mass to the incumbents’ by removing ‘the structural supports that give
[the system] its strength.’18 These actions, as Thornton goes on to explain,
will gradually sever the socio-psychological bonds that tie conditional
elements of the population to the state and force them to choose between a
disintegrating status quo and an emerging opposition. This cannot be
achieved with words; it can only be achieved with violence. In the words of a
19th century anarchist refrain:
The slave hath no other weapon





























Is justiﬁed in using both
To snap the chain that binds him tight.
The struggle itself, under these circumstances, is an instrument of agitation.
The objective ‘is to raise the level of revolutionary anticipation, and then of
popular participation [to such a degree] that the revolution becomes general
throughout the country’.19 This view was echoed by Menachem Begin in his
reﬂections on his years as the leader of the Zionist underground organisation,
Irgun Zvail Leumi. ‘The very existence of the underground’, Begin argued,
must ‘undermine the prestige of [the state] that lives by the legend of its
omnipotence. Every attack that it fails to prevent is a blow at its standing.
Even if the attack does not succeed, it makes a dent in that prestige, and that
dent widens into a crack which is extended with every succeeding attack.’20
The Irgun was never able to command attention, Begin suggested, until it
showed that it was able to act: ‘We were loved or hated’, he wrote, ‘but no
longer jeered at’. Any insurgency, he concluded, ‘that passes beyond the stage
of inevitable initial ridicule has gone halfway—perhaps the more diﬃcult half
of the way—to its goal.’21
Provocation eﬀect
Violence is also used to provoke the state into engaging in excessive counter-
measures in an eﬀort to improve the relative image of the insurgency. The
state, as noted elsewhere, begins the game with a force advantage but an
information disadvantage. It is generally able to hit what it sees, but it has a
limited ability to see what it wishes to hit. The insurgents, by contrast, enter
the game with an information advantage and a force disadvantage. They are
generally able to see what they wish to hit, but have a limited ability to hit
what they see.22 This asymmetry can be exploited by provoking the state into
striking out at targets it cannot see, alienating the population—who become
‘victims-by-substitution’23—and pushing people into the arms of the insur-
gents. ‘Because it is much easier to identify the movement’s sympathizers
than its participants, the unfortunate tendency is to apply repression
indiscriminately . . . This not only creates moral outrage, [it] destroys the
incentive not to join the battle among the opponent’s weakly committed
adherents.’24 The utility of such attacks ‘derives not from [their own]
popularity, but from the unpopularity of the ensuing repression’.25
Much of the mobilisation potential of an insurgent group, in this respect,
will result indirectly from its violent interaction with the state. This
relationship has been elevated to a point of necessity by many historical
commentators such as Carlos Marighella, author of the Minimanual of the
Urban Guerrilla, who argued that lack of discrimination on the part of a
regime is a critical precondition for establishing a mass base.26 Growing the
opposition, in this view, requires manoeuvring the incumbent regime into
the position where it ‘has no alternative except to intensify repression’.27 The
guerrillas, for their part, must have positioned themselves to pick up the




























pieces. Similar views were advanced by Che Guevara who, despite his many
failures as a guerrilla theorist, clearly understood the potential advantages of
government repression for promoting a group’s eﬀorts to establish a broad
popular base. The state, he wrote, in an eﬀort to preserve its appearance of
legitimacy, would always prefer to govern without the use of force. An
emerging insurgency must do everything it can to provoke the incumbent
regime into engaging in acts of indiscriminate violence, ‘thereby unmasking
its true nature’. Winning, he suggested, depends on forcing the state into a
Hobson’s choice—to either ‘retreat or unleash the struggle’. Regardless of
what it chooses to do, in this case its resulting decision will lay the
groundwork for a wider popular war.28
Demonstration eﬀect
Finally, and most importantly, violence is used for the purpose of generating
an exaggerated impression of insurgent strength and regime weakness. At the
beginning of the game the insurgents are organised clandestinely. While the
populace will have a pre-existing impression of the size of the incumbent, y,
the relative balance of power between the opposition and the state (x/y) is not
known. In the absence of this information, would-be supporters of the
underground estimate x (and by association x/y) by observing what the
opposition is able to achieve. The most visible of these activities are insurgent
attacks, which are used as an easily observable measure of group strength. As
the level and signiﬁcance of opposition-directed actions grows, popular
estimates of the relative size, capability and political prospects of the
resistance grow in turn. This can be expected to result in an increase in the
number of people who are willing to support the opposition and a decline in
support for the regime. Popular support, in this case, is not based on the facts
but on a generated illusion of insurgent capabilities.
This relationship is one of the enduring insights advanced by Regis
Debray, who argued that, if the guerrillas are to gain strength, they must
appear to be strong. At the outset of the struggle ‘the physical force of the
police and the army is considered [to be] unassailable’. This condition,
Debray suggested, which must be overcome before an insurgency is able to
get oﬀ the ground, can only be challenged ‘by showing that a soldier and a
policeman are no more bullet-proof than anyone else’. The guerrilla must
‘use his strength in order to show it, since he has little to show but his
determination and his ability to make use of his limited resources. He must
make a show of strength and at the same time demonstrate that the enemy’s
strength is ﬁrst and foremost his bluster’. ‘In order to destroy the idea of
unassailability’, he concluded, ‘there is nothing better than combat.’29 The
objective, in this case, is not to ensure that ‘the populace prefers the autho-
rities or the revolutionaries; what is important is perceived power: what the
people believe about the relative power of the two sides and about what will
happen to them if they support one side or the other’.30
How can these eﬀects be interpreted in terms of our model of conditional





























‘ﬁxing’ and ‘stiﬀening’ popular attitudes toward the opposition and the state.
In doing so, it will help to inﬂuence the shape and position of the guerrillas’
mobilisation function, f(xp), which is based, at least in part, on the underlying
distribution of popular preferences between the two sides. Action, in short,
forces people to choose sides. As Kropotkin observed, ‘Indiﬀerence [once the
ﬁght has been joined] is impossible. Those who [may never before have asked]
themselves what ‘‘those lunatics’’ were after, are forced to take notice of
them, to discuss their ideas, and to take a stand for or against. By actions
which compel general attention, the new idea seeps into people’s minds and
wins converts.’ One such act, Kropotkin concluded, can make more
propaganda in a few days ‘than thousands of pamphlets’. Above all, he
argued, ‘it awakens the spirit of revolt [and] breeds daring . . . The people
observe that the monster is not so terrible as they thought . . . hope is born in
their hearts’.31
The shape and position of the opposition’s mobilisation curve can also be
inﬂuenced, indirectly, by the provocation eﬀect of insurgent actions. Any
actions that provoke the state into responding indiscriminately against
uncommitted elements of the population will result in a shift in popular
attitudes towards the other side. The signiﬁcance of this shift will depend on
the magnitude of the government’s response, its lack (or otherwise) of
discrimination, the percentage and distribution of the population that is
either directly or indirectly aﬀected by government counter-violence, and the
elasticity of popular preferences to incumbent attacks. To the degree that the
political preferences of the population change in favour of the opposition, it
will result in a leftward shift in the rebel’s mobilisation function. The nature
and consequences of this move are illustrated in Figure 4 in a shift from
Curve A to Curve B. The most important eﬀect of this shift is to raise the
FIGURE 4. Shifting mobilisation curve.




























insurgents’ low-level equilibrium point from x1 to x1
0 and lower their
insurrection point from xc to xc
0. The combined eﬀect of these changes is to
reduce the opposition’s mobilisation dilemma by reducing the group’s
opening ‘mobilisation gap’ between x1 and xc.
The same leftward shift in the mobilisation curve can be generated through
the demonstration eﬀect by reducing popular perceptions of the strength of
the state, yp. Just as a growing preference for the opposition, as noted in the
paragraph above, results in an increasing incentive to support the rebellion
for a given opportunity to do so, any reduction in the perceived strength of
the state increases the opportunity to rebel for a given distribution of
preferences. These eﬀects can work to support one another in cases where the
insurgency’s symbolic attacks not only make the state look vulnerable to
guerrilla actions but also incite it to lash out indiscriminately against the
population. They can oﬀset each other in cases where regime counter-actions
further alienate the population but also reinvigorate popular estimates of its
ability and willingness to carry the war to the insurgency. What is ultimately
important, once again, is the net eﬀect not only of the initial actions of the
insurgency, but of the resulting counter-actions of the state. If the combined
net eﬀect of each side’s actions shifts the insurgents’ reaction curve to the
right, it will increase xc and retard mobilisation. If the net eﬀect shifts the
curve to the left, xc will decrease and the insurgency’s mobilisation
environment will improve.
Finally, the demonstration eﬀect can help resolve a group’s mobilisation
dilemma by altering popular perceptions of insurgent strength, xp. Where a
reduction in popular perceptions of state strength, yp, moves the group’s
insurrection point to the left, making xc easier to achieve, any increase in the
perceived strength of the insurgency has the eﬀect of moving xp to the right,
pushing the organisation closer to the point of critical mass. A well designed
campaign of symbolic attacks, of course, can achieve both of these eﬀects at
the same time. Opposition groups attempt to generate images of group
strength and regime weakness through the targeted use of high-proﬁle
violence. Oberschall has referred to actions of this type as ‘identiﬁcation
moves’.32 In contrast to his discussion, however, where the purpose of the
action is to demonstrate how powerful the opposition has really become to
an unbelieving regime, the insurgents’ objective in the early days of the
struggle is to create an illusion of strength for its unbelieving constituents.
The strength of this illusion will be a function of the illusion of strength the
insurgents are able to create in the minds of their would-be followers.
Resolving the mobilisation paradox
The manipulation of violent images, then, can create an impression of group
strength and regime weakness that is quite diﬀerent from the actual
correlation of forces between the insurgents and the state at the beginning
of the game. This, in turn, can be used to induce individuals to act in a
manner that will turn their impressions into facts, changing the real balance





























of insurgent strength, but an instrument for elevating the group to a position
of strength in the ﬁrst place. Carrying out such a programme, of course,
would be an easy matter if the group were as good as it wished to appear. The
problem it faces is to put together a targeting campaign, given its limited
capacity to act, that makes it appear to be better than it is. If the opposition is
going to oﬀset its opening limitations and create the illusion that it is a going
concern, its actions must produce a combined perceptual eﬀect that is greater
than the sum of the physical consequences of its operations.33
The ideal action, in this respect, is one that not only gains local attention,
but one that is picked up and retransmitted by mass media. Media attention
ampliﬁes the symbolic content of insurgent attacks and expands the
insurgents’ pool of observers. In the past decade traditional media have
been augmented by the proliferation of internet-based and other insurgent-
controlled outlets that have revolutionised the way in which insurgent
imagery is packaged and conveyed to target audiences. The internet, in
particular, has emerged as a natural medium for underground groups to
advertise their actions (and the crimes of their opponents). It is the rare
insurgency today without at least one website. Many groups, such as
al-Qaida, Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), to name a few, have launched
multiple sites in diﬀerent languages, each tailored to a speciﬁc viewing
audience. In contrast to traditional media, the web oﬀers opposition groups
easy access, little or no regulation, an unlimited audience, a multimedia
environment, and a near real-time reporting cycle.34 As we have seen in Iraq
and Lebanon, attacks carried out in the morning can be viewed on a group’s
website in the afternoon, complete with video, audio and an accompanying
message. The internet has made symbolic violence a more powerful instru-
ment of insurgent mobilisation than at any time in the past.
The media value of insurgent operations is inﬂuenced by the level, the
direction and the rate of change in the pattern of violence. It is also shaped,
signiﬁcantly, by the symbolic quality of the insurgents’ target set. Opposition
violence, in this respect, is not an undiﬀerentiated variable. Diﬀerent types of
actions, against diﬀerent types of targets, carried out under diﬀerent
circumstances, at diﬀerent times will not only elicit diﬀerent impressions on
the part of those who witness them, they will also inﬂuence the level of
exposure these attacks can expect to receive in the ﬁrst place. These factors,
in turn, will inﬂuence the degree to which insurgent actions will contribute to
their follow-on recruiting eﬀort. With this division in mind, the ﬁrst decision
the opposition must make is to determine what percentage of their limited
resources they are going to invest in ‘organising’ and what percentage they
are going to invest in ‘operating’. Their second decision is to design a
schedule of attacks, given this investment strategy. As a general rule rational
insurgents will attempt to design a targeting schedule that oﬀers them the
highest possible perceptual return, given their material and political
constraints.
In the end, of course, organising and operating are reciprocally related.
While a programme of directed violence, as we have argued, is often a




























prerequisite for growth, a group’s organising investment will help determine
the facility and the speed with which it is able to build on its attacks to
expand its organisational base. Its rate of growth, in turn, will inﬂuence the
scope of its operations in the next time period. How insurgents manage this
relationship and decide to divide their operational and organisational eﬀorts
is an interesting issue in its own right. For our purposes it is suﬃcient to point
out that translating a schedule of violence into organisational growth
presupposes the existence of an institutional mechanism for identifying,
enlisting, organising and employing the eﬀorts of new supporters. At the
outset of the struggle these organising functions must be performed by the
same revolutionary nucleus that is responsible for preparing and executing
the group’s targeting campaign.35 Even as the insurgency begins to grow, the
disparity between the opposition’s ambitious ends and limited means will
often result in a continuing tension between these two lines of eﬀort. The
early success or failure of the insurgency will depend on its ability to carry
out these parallel activities as eﬃciently as possible and in a co-ordinated
manner to resolve its opening dilemma.
Complicating these considerations is the natural trade-oﬀ that exists
between the security and eﬃciency of underground organisations. Insurgen-
cies, like other kinds of illegal organisations, must be able to maintain some
minimal level of security to stay in the game, much less to grow the force and
go on to win.36 This, in turn, requires maintaining some minimal level of
organisational invisibility in the face of regime eﬀorts to uncover their
leadership, infrastructure, and routines. What these minima are, at any point
in time, will depend on group size, group structure, the group’s breakpoint
and the nature of the prevailing security environment. This trade-oﬀ imposes
operational and organisational constraints. The ﬁrst of these will inﬂuence
the scale, number, character and targets of insurgent attacks. The second will
limit the openness and, hence, the eﬃciency with which the group is able to
exploit the eﬀects of these attacks and expand its active base of support.
Should the group’s security environment become more restrictive over
time, this tension will become more acute. Should this environment become
more permissive, the group’s security – eﬃciency trade-oﬀ will become less
restrictive.
The operational challenge facing insurgent decision makers, then, is to
design a targeting plan that will allow them to push beyond their point of
critical mass in view of: a) their opening resource constraints; b) the facility
with which they are able to mobilise new cadre; and c) the restrictions
imposed by their security context. By way of analogy this problem is similar
conceptually to the problem of determining the best regimen for taking a
prescription drug. In most cases there is a minimum level of concentration
below which the drug is ineﬀective, and a maximum level of concentration
above which it is unsafe. Typically one must also maintain a minimum level
of concentration in the bloodstream for a speciﬁed period of time for the
drug to be eﬀective. One complicating consideration is the fact that the level
of concentration from any single dose of the drug is naturally reduced over





























gradually increases. With these factors in mind, the questions that must be
asked are: how much of the drug should be administered in each dose, how
frequently should it be taken, and for how long should it be prescribed to
achieve the desired result?
These are the same questions that are asked by an insurgency considering
how to use violence to promote organisational growth. To extend
the analogy, the critical ‘concentration level’ that must be achieved by the
opposition, in this case, is deﬁned by its point of critical mass, xc. The
operational problem it faces is to design a feasible targeting schedule that will
push xp beyond xc and hold it there long enough to exploit its bandwagon
eﬀects. In doing so, the opposition must account for the fact that the
perceptual impact of any actions it will carry out will dissipate with time and
that popular resistance to such images will gradually increase as violence
becomes more routine. The insurgency must also be concerned with the
question of risk in an environment where a suﬃciently large breach in
security could kill the patient. In principle, the insurgents are highly likely to
have alternative targeting strategies available to them for achieving their
objectives. Their decision problem will be to determine what the best of these
alternatives is given the various constraints they must operate under during
this phase of the struggle.
The nature of this problem is shown in Figures 5 and 6, which illustrate
two diﬀerent paths for achieving a position of critical mass. We assume in
both cases that the group’s insurrection point, xc, is constant and situated
well below its minimum security threshold at xs. The insurgents’ security
environment, in this case, is a permissive one in relation to their objective. In
Figure 5 we see them carry out a strong opening campaign to boost xp above
xc through a single and signiﬁcant set of demonstration attacks. In the
FIGURE 5. Achieving critical mass.




























absence of any immediate follow-on attacks, xp will gradually decline before
it is boosted up again in a subsequent set of actions. This pattern of follow-on
actions continues until the group is able to exploit the shift in popular
perceptions and reach the point where the size of x¼ xp¼ xc. In Figure 6 we
see the same point reached by a diﬀerent targeting schedule. Rather than lead
with a large opening attack, the insurgents carry out a larger number of
smaller (and less risky) actions that gradually push xp across the same
threshold point over time. Assuming that the group is able to successfully
exploit the perceptual results of these armed actions along the way,
x¼ xp¼ xc is reached by a diﬀerent route.
A similar situation is depicted in Figure 7, but with a declining insurrection
point. As discussed earlier, because the insurgents’ mobilisation curve is
ultimately tied to popular preferences as well as to perceptions of state
strength, yp, the shape and position of their mobilisation function will change
with a change in either of these variables. Any change in the shape of the
insurgents’ reaction curve, of course, also inﬂuences the conditionality of
mobilisation more generally, changing the rate at which new individuals will
be willing to support the opposition given the number of people they believe
have already signed on. A favourable shift in the insurgents’ reaction curve,
in this respect, will not only push down its insurrection point, xc, it will also
tend to speed up the rate at which people will be willing to support the
insurgency in the wake of a perceived increase in group strength, xp. The
opposite, again, will be true in the event the shift in the curve is favorable to
the state.
Finally, Figure 8 depicts a case where, at the outset of the game, the
insurgents confront a situation in which xc is situated well above xs. The
opposition’s security environment in this instance is a highly restrictive one.
Even assuming it has the resources to do so, the group will be unable to push





























xp beyond xc without crossing well above its minimum security threshold and
jeopardising its existence. The longer it must operate above this minimum to
successfully exploit the eﬀects of its actions, furthermore, the more likely it
will be that the group will be put out of business before it achieves critical
mass. The guerrillas’ targeting campaign, under these circumstances, must
ﬁrst be directed against the state’s instruments of control in an eﬀort to
expand its room for manoeuvre. While such attacks have a demonstration
value of their own, this will typically require the insurgents to go after a
FIGURE 7. Declining insurrection point, Xc.
FIGURE 8. Restrictive security regime.




























diﬀerent (and often better ‘hardened’) set of targets (eg police, military and
intelligence targets) than those that would otherwise be selected. If they are
successful, as illustrated in Figure 8, these eﬀorts will provide them with the
operational space they require to eventually achieve critical mass. If they are
unsuccessful, they will remain below xc. While this may be suﬃcient for the
group to survive in some form, it will be insuﬃcient to win.37
Conclusion: things come together
Any given population, we have argued, can be divided into conditional and
unconditional political participants. Unconditional participants, who will
typically comprise a small percentage of the population, constitute the ‘hard
core’ supporters of each side. Conditional participants, by contrast, are
willing to support one side or the other depending upon their expectations
concerning the course and outcome of the struggle. These expectations, in
turn, are conditioned by their beliefs about what the rest of the population is
doing. If popular sentiments appear to be tilting towards the opposition,
conditional participants will tilt in turn. If the opposition appears to be
unable to gain a signiﬁcant popular base, they will tend to withhold their own
support as well. A population’s pure preferences, in these circumstances, are
an unreliable guide to political behaviour. Conditional ‘loyalists’ cannot be
depended on to support the state should its perceived base of support
continue to decline over time. Similarly, conditional ‘activists’ cannot be
depended on to support the insurgents in the face of a continuing decline in
insurgent support. The ultimate victor in this contest, whichever side it is, will
win with a weak popular coalition.
Drawing on Schelling’s general analysis of conditional response, we show
how the dynamics of conditional support can place opposition groups in an
unusually diﬃcult position during the opening period of an insurgency. If the
majority of the population, regardless of its pre-existing political sympathies,
is reluctant to support the opposition until it is a going concern, it can prove
diﬃcult to get anyone to sign on in the ﬁrst place. While an incipient
insurgent group faced with this situation can depend on the continued
support of its hard-core base, it will have diﬃculty generating the level of
conditional support it needs from the rest of the population to become a
signiﬁcant political force. If the opposition is operating in a typical
mobilisation environment, there is some critical size beyond which its level
of popular support will begin to grow of its own accord. Once this crossover
point is reached, the group will enjoy the bandwagon eﬀects associated with
achieving a position of critical mass. The chief operational problem it faces is
getting to this point in the ﬁrst place. Any attempt to expand the ranks of the
opposition that does not achieve this critical value will tend to collapse back
to its initial low equilibrium point. This point is unlikely to be much larger
than the group’s core base of support.
Armed opposition groups attempt to overcome this dilemma through the
manipulation of violent images. Directed violence is used, in the ﬁrst place, as





























the terms of the struggle and force people to take a political position. It is
also used to provoke the state into the excessive and misdirected use of
counter-violence in the hope that this will alienate otherwise neutral elements
of the population and reshape their preferences in favour of the opposition.
While such actions, as we have argued, may well reduce the insurgents’
mobilisation dilemma, they are unlikely to eliminate it altogether. Regardless
of what people think of the standing regime, most will still be unwilling to
back the opposition unless they believe it has a reasonable chance of success.
This, in turn, will depend on their subjective perceptions of its size and level
of support. To overcome this barrier, violence is used to signal group
strength. The initial challenge in this case is not to communicate how strong
the group has become in fact, but to create the impression that it is stronger
than it really is.
A group’s impression of strength will depend on the strength of the
impression it is able to generate in the minds of its would-be supporters. As a
clandestine organisation, the actual strength of the opposition will be
unknown to its target audience. The group’s visible performance, in such
cases, will be used as a surrogate variable to measure its capabilities and
prospects. The most important measure of performance is the quantity and
quality of its attacks. All other things being equal, an eﬀective and rising
pattern of violence is a signal of strength. It will appear that the future
belongs to the insurgents. An ineﬀective and declining level of activity, by
contrast, is a signal of weakness. It will appear that the opposition’s days are
numbered and that the future belongs to the state. In the short run the
opposition must depend on its ability to create a false reality through the
perceptual eﬀect of its armed actions. To the degree that it is able to do so, it
will have created the opportunity to turn its generated images into facts and
resolve its opening mobilisation dilemma. While the insurgency must still be
able to eﬀectively exploit this opportunity to win, it will have overcome a
primary barrier to its success.
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